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Abstract. Embedded information assurance applications that are critical to na-
tional and international infrastructures, must often adhere to certiﬁcation regimes
that require information ﬂow properties to be speciﬁed and veriﬁed. SPARK, a
subset of Ada for engineering safety critical systems, is being used to develop
multiple certiﬁed information assurance systems. While SPARK provides infor-
mation ﬂow annotations and associated automated checking mechanisms, indus-
trial experience has revealed that these annotations are not precise enough to
specify many desired information ﬂow policies. One key problem is that arrays
are treated as indivisible entities – ﬂows that involve only particular locations of
an array have to be abstracted into ﬂows on the whole array. This has substantial
practical impact since SPARK does not allow dynamic allocation of memory, and
hence makes heavy use of arrays to implement complex data structures.
In this paper, we present a Hoare logic for information ﬂow that enables precise
compositional speciﬁcation of information ﬂow in programs with arrays, and au-
tomateddeductionalgorithmsforcheckingandinferringcontractsinanenhanced
SPARK information ﬂow contract language. We demonstrate the expressiveness
of the enhanced contracts and effectiveness of the automated veriﬁcation algo-
rithm on realistic embedded applications.
1 Introduction
Much effort has been spent on developing techniques to analyze information ﬂow in
computer programs [27] – leading to several languages such as Myers’ JFlow [21],
and FlowCaml [28], that include language-level speciﬁcations (often in the form of
“security types”) and automated checking mechanisms that establish that a program’s
information ﬂow conforms to supplied speciﬁcations. SPARK, a safety-critical subset
of Ada, is being used by various organizations, including Rockwell Collins [23] and
the US National Security Agency (NSA) [7], to engineer information assurance sys-
tems including cryptographic controllers, network guards, and key management sys-
tems. SPARK provides automatically checked procedure annotations that specify infor-
mation ﬂows between procedure inputs and outputs. In the certiﬁcation process, these
annotations play a key role justifying conformance to information ﬂow requirements
and separation policies relevant to architectures such as MILS (Multiple Independent
Levels of Security) [10]. However, experience in these industrial/government devel-
opment efforts has shown that the annotations of SPARK, as well as those of other
language-based information ﬂow speciﬁcation frameworks, are not precise enough tospecify many important information ﬂow policies. In such situations, policy adherence
arguments are often reduced to informal claims substantiated by manual inspections
that are time-consuming, tedious, and error-prone.
Inability to specify desired information ﬂow policies in realistic applications, us-
ing existing language annotation frameworks, often stems from two issues: a) Coarse
treatment of information channels, where information ﬂowing between two variables
is regarded as creating a channel without regard to the conditions under which that
channel is active; and b) Coarse treatment of structured data, such as arrays, where in-
formation can only be speciﬁed as ﬂowing into/from an array as a whole, instead of its
constituent cells. Our previous work [5] gives one approach for addressing the ﬁrst issue
by providing inference and checking of conditional information ﬂow contracts, allow-
ing the speciﬁcation of conditions that determine when the information ﬂow channels
are active, using a precondition generation algorithm and an extension to the logic pre-
viously developed by Amtoft and Banerjee [2,3]. This paper builds on this earlier work
to address the second problem: precise information ﬂow analysis for arrays.
Support for precise reasoning about information ﬂow in arrays is especially impor-
tant in resource-bounded embedded high-assurance security applications, because stor-
age for data structures such as buffers, rule tables, etc., must often be statically allocated
and accessed via offset calculations. Motivated by the need to guarantee analyzability
and conformance to resource bounds, SPARK does not include pointers and heap-based
data. Thus, complex data structures must be implemented in terms of arrays whose size
is ﬁxed at compile time.
This paper presents a novel approach for automated contract-based reasoning about
information ﬂow within arrays – targeted to applications that require high assurance and
certiﬁcation. The speciﬁc contributions of this work are as follows:
– A language-independent Hoare-like logic for secure information ﬂow that can be
used to reason precisely about information ﬂow between array components,
– An extension of the SPARK information ﬂow contract language (with semantics
providedbytheHoarelogic)thatsupportsspeciﬁcationofinformationﬂowpolicies
about array components,
– An algorithm for automatically checking and inferring enhanced SPARK contracts
against code,
– A novel approach for computing universally-quantiﬁed information ﬂow properties
for arrays,
– The study of an information assurance application that shows the importance of
precise information ﬂow analysis for arrays, based on the MILS Message Router
speciﬁcation given in [25], and
– An empirical evaluation of the performance and veriﬁcation effectiveness of our
approach against a collection of SPARK programs.
The logical/algorithmic foundations of our work are language independent, and could
be applied to array-based data structures in other languages. However, our implementa-
tion in the context of SPARK is especially relevant because SPARK is the only commer-
cially supported framework that we know of for specifying and checking information
ﬂows.Indeed,thisworkhasbeeninspiredbychallengeproblemsprovidedbyourindus-
trial collaborators at Rockwell Collins who are using SPARK on multiple information
assurance development projects.
2procedure SinglePositionAssign
( Flag : in Int ; Value : in Types . Flagvalue )
− −# global in out Flags ;
− −# derives Flags from ∗, Flag , Value ;
is
begin
Flags ( Flag ) := Value ;
end SinglePositionAssign ;
procedure Scrub Cache ( cache : in out Sensor Cache Type )
− −# derives cache from ∗;
is
begin
for I in Sensor Ids loop
cache ( I ) := 0;
end loop ;
end Scrub Cache ;
procedure Copy Keys ( inkeys : in Key Table Type ,
outkeys : in out Key Table Type )
− −# derives outkeys from ∗, inkeys ;
is
begin
for I in Key Table Entries loop
outkeys ( I ) := inkeys ( I );
end loop ;
end Scrub Cache ;
(a)
procedure SinglePositionAssign
( Flag : in Int ; Value : in Types . Flagvalue )
− −# global out Flags ( Flag );
− −# derives Flags ( Flag ) from Value ;
is
begin
Flags ( Flag ) := Value ;
end SinglePositionAssign ;
procedure Scrub Cache ( cache : out Sensor Cache Type )
− −# derives for all J in Sensor Ids = > ( cache ( J ) from {});
is
begin
for I in Sensor Ids loop
cache ( I ) := 0;
end loop ;
end Scrub Cache ;
procedure Copy Keys ( inkeys : in Key Table Type ,
outkeys : out Key Table Type )
− −# derives for all J in Key Table Entries
− −# = > ( outkeys ( J ) from inkeys ( J ) ) ;
is
begin
for I in Key Table Entries loop
outkeys ( I ) := inkeys ( I );
end loop ;
end Copy Keys ;
(b)
Fig.1. (a) Limitations of SPARK annotations and (b) proposed enhancements.
2 Information Flow Contracts in SPARK
SPARK is a safety critical subset of Ada developed and supported by Praxis High In-
tegrity Systems that provides (a) an annotation language for writing both functional
and information ﬂow software contracts, and (b) automated static analyses and semi-
automated proof assistants for proving absence of run-time exceptions, and confor-
mance of code to contracts. SPARK has been used to build a number of high-assurance
systems including the UK’s iFACTS next generation air trafﬁc control system.
Figure 1 (a) shows a collection of very simple procedures with SPARK information
ﬂow annotations. SPARK demands that all procedures explicitly declare all the global
variables that they read and/or write. As illustrated in the SinglePositionAssign
procedure, this is done via a global annotation that lists global variables with each
variable preﬁxed by a modiﬁer that indicates the mode of the variable, i.e., whether the
variable is read (in), written (out), or both (in out). Parameters to the procedures
must also be annotated with in and out modiﬁers indicating their mode. In addition,
all out variables (i.e., all variables that are modiﬁed by the procedures) must declare
a derives clause. A derives clause for out variable X speciﬁes the in parame-
ters/globals whose initial values were used to derive the ﬁnal value of variable X. In
SinglePositionAssign, the derives clause states that the out variable Flags is
derived from itself (*), Flag and Value. SPARK also provides other annotation mech-
anisms to specify pre- and postconditions, but for this discussion we will focus on those
directly related to information ﬂow analysis.
While the semantics of existing SPARK contracts, as presented in Figure 1 (a),
can be captured using conventional slicing and data/control-dependence, we have de-
veloped a more powerful and ﬂexible theory of information ﬂow contracts backed by a
Hoare-style logic, and a precondition generation algorithm [5] that is able to provide ad-
ditional analysis precision and contract expressiveness not found in conventional static-
analysis-based approaches. Moreover, in the context of embedded applications and lan-
guages like SPARK, which eschew complicated language features, we have been able
3to achieve this power while maintaining a very high degree of automation and low com-
putational costs. In our previous work [5], we demonstrated how this logical framework
could support extensions to SPARK contracts that allow developers to specify that in-
formation ﬂows from inputs to an output only under certain conditions, i.e., conditional
information ﬂow. This provides the ability to state information ﬂow policies that are
typical of network guard applications, where a message on an input port may ﬂow to a
certain output in one state, but may ﬂow to a different output in another state.
In this paper, we overcome other limitations of conventional dependence/informa-
tion ﬂow frameworks by adding additional capabilities to the logic, and associated auto-
mated deduction algorithms that enable precise reasoning about array-based data struc-
tures. Figure 1 (a) presents a series of micro-examples that illustrate the deﬁciencies
of current SPARK annotations for arrays, and Fig. 1 (b) shows our proposed enhance-
ments. These examples are concise representations of common idioms that occur in the
embedded information assurance applications of our industrial partners.
Procedure SinglePositionAssign assigns a value to a particular index position
(the value of Flag) in the array Flags. However, the SPARK information ﬂow contract
states that (a) the whole array is modiﬁed (i.e., global out flags), and (b) the new
valueofthearrayisderivedfromitsoldvalue,the Valueparameter,andthe Flagindex
parameter. This is an over-approximation of the true frame-condition and information
ﬂow, but the contract cannot be made more precise in the current SPARK annotation
language. To remedy this, Figure 1 (b) illustrates that our enhanced language provides
the ability to specify properties of particular array cells. The global out declaration
now indicates that the only array cell modiﬁed is Flags(Flag) (which currently is
a disallowed global expression in SPARK) while the contents of other cells remain
unchanged. The enhanced derives indicates that the modiﬁed cell derives its value
only from the parameter Value. To support this more precise reasoning, the underlying
analysis algorithm must be able to reason symbolically about array index values.
Scrub Cache in Fig. 1 (a) presents a code idiom often used when initializing an
array or scrubbing the contents of a message buffer; all positions of the array are ini-
tialized to a constant value. The SPARK annotations required for this example exhibit
several forms of imprecision. First, the cache array parameter must be declared with
mode in even though no array element value is read during execution of the procedure.
Second, the information ﬂow speciﬁcation captured in the derives clause is the an-
tithesis of what we desire: it states that the ﬁnal value of cache depends on the initial
value of cache, whereas we desire a speciﬁcation that captures the fact that the ﬁnal
value of cache does not depend on the initial value of cache, i.e., all values in the
input cache have been erased.
This imprecision stems from the fact that on each iteration of the loop, the entire
array is treated as a single entity in the information ﬂow analysis: the updated value of
the array depends on a constant value at position I and on its previous value at all posi-
tions other than I. Since ﬂow from constants is not indicated in SPARK contracts, the
information ﬂow analysis indicates that the new value of the array depends on the old
value at every iteration. There is no way to indicate that the loop has carried out an ex-
haustive processing of each position of the array in which the old value at each position
is overwritten with a new value not based on the array’s previous contents. Figure 1 (b)
4Expressions:
arithmetic
A ::= x | u | c | A op A | H[A]
array
H ::= h | Z | H{A : A}
boolean
φ,B ::= A bop A | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ¬φ
Commands:
S ::= skip | S ;S | x := A | assert(φ)
| call p
| if B then S else S
| for q ← 1 to y do S
| while B do S od
| h := new | h[A] := A
Fig.2. Syntax of a simple imperative language.
illustrates that we address this problem by extending the speciﬁcation language with
a notion of universal quantiﬁcation (using syntax based on SPARK’s universal quan-
tiﬁcation allowed in assertions) to specify schematically the information ﬂow for each
array cell. We also add the capability to indicate that the source of the information ﬂow
is some constant (represented by {}). Together, these additions allow us to formalize
the higher level security policy: the array contents are indeed scrubbed – cache’s ﬁnal
value does not depend in any way on its initial value, nor does information from any
other piece of the program state ﬂows into it.
To support this more precise reasoning, the underlying analysis algorithm must be
able to perform a logical universal generalization step to introduce the quantiﬁed ﬂow
speciﬁcation. In general, this is quite difﬁcult to do, but we have found that loops that
manipulate arrays often follow a structure that admits an automated solution. When
an automated solution is not possible, the developer may supply an information ﬂow
loop invariant (which are simpler than functional invariants) that enables the rest of the
checking to be completed automatically.
The Copy Keys example of Fig. 1 (a) illustrates a common idiom in which the con-
tents of a table are copied, or where a portion of a database is moved from a central
database to a copy for a client. In essence, this creates multiple channels of informa-
tion ﬂow – one channel for each index position of the arrays. In such cases, one often
seeks to verify a separation policy that states that information ﬂow between the differ-
ent channels is not confused or merged. The SPARK derives clause for Copy Keys
simply states that information ﬂows from the inkeys array to the outkeys array and
cannot capture the separation property that information only ﬂows between correspond-
ing entries of the arrays. Fig. 1 (b) illustrates that, using the universal quantiﬁcation
introduced in the previous paragraph, one formalizes the policy that information only
ﬂows between entries at the same index position. Notice also that this enables us to
specify ﬂow between different regions of the array, by having the quantiﬁed variables
take values from more restricted ranges of the possible index values.
3 Syntax and Semantics Background
We now present the foundations of our approach using a simple imperative language
that can be considered an “idealized core language” for SPARK. Since SPARK omits
constructsthataredifﬁculttoreasonabout,suchasdynamicallyallocateddata,pointers,
and exceptions, its semantics is very close to that of this language.
In Fig. 2, we present the syntax of the simple imperative language. For commands,
proceduresareparameterless;thissimpliﬁesourexpositionbutourimplementationsup-
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functionality). In for loops, following similar restrictions in SPARK, we require that
the index variable q is not modiﬁed by S, and does not occur anywhere except in S.
Arrays are restricted to a single dimension with integer contents. Array assignment has
two forms: h := new creates an array with all elements set to 0, and h[A0] := A1
assigns the integer value of A1 to array h at the index position given by A0. For con-
venience of presentation, we omit some SPARK features such as records and package
structure since these do not present conceptual challenges.
We use E to range over expressions which include arithmetic, boolean, and array
expressions. Boolean expressions are also used as assertions. We use x to range over
integer (scalar) variables (but q to range over such when used as counters in for loops),
h to range over array variables, u to range over universally quantiﬁed variables; we
shall use w,z to range over all kind of variables. We use c to range over integer con-
stants, op to range over arithmetic operators in {+,×,mod,...}, and bop to range over
comparison operators in {=,<,...}.
To enable convenient reasoning about individual array elements, in particular the
computation of preconditions, we follow Gries [18] and allow, in intermediate forms of
assertions manipulated by the automated reasoning engine, the construct H{A0 : A1},
which represents the value of array H except that index A0 now has value A1. We also
use Z to denote an initial array as created by the command h := new. We require a
program (command) submitted for veriﬁcation to be pure in the sense that it does not
contain these additional array constructs. Thus, in a pure entity, all array accesses are
of the form h[A] with h a variable. Similarly, universal variables u are used only in
speciﬁcations; programs submitted for veriﬁcation cannot contain universal variables.
The use of programmer assertions is optional, but often helps to improve the preci-
sion of our analysis. We refer to the assertions of Fig. 2 as 1-assertions since they repre-
sent predicates on a single program state; they can be contrasted with 2-assertions that
we introduce later for reasoning about information ﬂow in terms of a pair of program
states. For an expression E, we write fv(E) for the variables in E and write E[A/x] for
the result of substituting in E all occurrences of x by A (similarly for E[H/h]).
Fig. 3 gives excerpts of the language semantics deﬁnition (the deﬁnitions for con-
ditionals and while loops are standard and omitted). In the expression semantics, we
model an array as a mapping (a ∈ Array) from integers to values, where a value
(v ∈ Val) is an integer n; we write [a | n →v] for the array that is like a except that it
maps n into v. We shall ignore bounds and range checks (unlike [15] where array length
may be revealed separately from array content) and assume that an array reference a(n)
is always well-deﬁned (the typical SPARK development process will prove statically
that array-out-of-bounds exceptions cannot occur).
A store s ∈ Store (we shall also use σ to range over stores) maps scalar and univer-
sal variables to values, and array variables to arrays; we write dom(s) for the domain
of s and write [s | x →v] ([s | h →a]) for the store that is like s except that it maps x
into v (maps h into a), and write [s | h(n) →v] for [s | h →[s(h) | n →v]]. We write
s |= φ for [[φ]]s = True. We deﬁne φ and φ′ to be 1-equivalent, written φ ≡1 φ′, if for
all s it holds that s |= φ iff s |= φ′. Similarly, we write φ ⊲1 φ′ if whenever s |= φ then
also s |= φ′.
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[[x]]s = s(x) similarly for u
[[H[A]]]s = [[H]]s([[A]]s)
[[h]]s = s(h)
[[Z]]s = λn.0
[[H{A0 : A}]]s = [[[H]]s | [[A0]]s  →[[A]]s]
Commands: s [[x := A]] s
′ iff ∃v : v = [[A]]s and s
′ = [s | x →v]
s [[assert(φ)]] s
′ iff s |= φ and s
′ = s
s [[call p]] s
′ iff s P(p) s
′
s [[for q ← 1 to y do S]] s
′ iff ∃n ≥ 1 : n = s(y) and ∀i ∈ {0...n} ∃si : s0 = s and
s
′ = [sn | q →n + 1] and ∀j ∈ {1...n} : [sj−1 | q →j] [[S]] sj
s [[h[A0] := A]] s
′ iff ∃n,v : n = [[A0]]s, v = [[A]]s and s
′ = [s | h(n) →v]
s [[h := new]] s
′ iff s
′ = [s | h →λn.0]
Fig.3. Semantics of the Simple Programming Language (excerpts).
In the deﬁnition of the call command, we assume a global procedure environment
P that for each p returns a relation between input and output stores; we expect that if
s P(p) s′ then, with Sp the body of p, we have s [[Sp]] s′. For some S and s, there may
not exist any s′ such that s [[S]] s′; this can happen if a while loop does not terminate,
a for loop has a non-positive upper bound, or an assert fails.
4 Information Flow Contracts for Arrays
To motivate our treatment of information ﬂow, consider the code
procedure p begin x := a+1; y := b ∗ 2; end p ;
where there are two “channels” of information ﬂow associated with x and y: (1) from
a to x, and (2) from b to y Using SPARK to specify these ﬂows, we would write:
derives x from a & y from b;
We may express the “non-interference” [16] of the assignment to y with channel (1) via
the following semantic property: for any pair of states s1 and s2, if s1(a) = s2(a) then
s′
1(x) = s′
2(x) where s′
1, s′
2 are the states that result from executing the procedure body
ons1 ands2,respectively.Thusxdependsonabutonnoothervariables,cf.Cohen[12].
We desire to state such properties (which would provide a semantic foundation for
derives contracts), using program level assertions. However, the property requires
reasoning about two states at method pre/postcondition (cf. s1 and s2). Thus, it cannot
be stated using traditional assertions, because such assertions are interpreted in terms
of one state at a particular program point.
The innovation of the logic developed in [1,2] lies in the introduction of a novel
agreement assertion x⋉ that is satisﬁed by a pair of states, s1 and s2, if s1(x) = s2(x).
Using this assertion, the non-interference property above is phrased {a⋉} S {x⋉}.
In general, triples are of the form {x1⋉,...,xn⋉} P {y1⋉,...,ym⋉} which is in-
terpreted as follows: given two runs of P that initially agree on variables x1 ...xn,
at the end of both runs, they agree on variables y1 ...ym. Such a speciﬁcation says
that the variables yj may depend only on the variables xi, and not on any other vari-
ables. In situations as above where we want to reason about multiple separated chan-
nels of information ﬂow simultaneously (e.g., a to x and b to y), we would not write
{a⋉,b⋉} S {x⋉,y⋉} since this would imply that y may depend on a and x depend on
b. Instead, channel-indexed agreement assertions would be used to distinguish the sep-
arate channels for x and y: {a⋉x,b⋉y} S {x⋉x,y⋉y}. This is equivalent to requiring
both {a⋉} S {x⋉} and {b⋉} S {y⋉} to hold in the unindexed version of the logic.
7Our implementation uses the indexed assertions to deal with multiple channels, but to
simplify the formalization, in this document we shall deal with one channel at a time.
One advantage of this logical approach over traditional data/control-ﬂow based ap-
proaches to reasoning about information ﬂow and program dependencies, is that the
assertion primitive can be enhanced to reason about additional properties of the state –
leading to greater precision and ﬂexibility. For example, to capture conditional informa-
tion ﬂow, we use conditional agreement assertions φ ⇒ E⋉, also called 2-assertions,
introduced by Banerjee and the ﬁrst author [3]. Such assertions are satisﬁed by a pair
of stores if either at least one of them does not satisfy φ, or they agree on the value of
E: s & σ |= φ ⇒ E⋉ iff whenever s |= φ and σ |= φ then [[E]]s = [[E]]σ.
We use θ ∈ 2Assert to range over 2-assertions. For θ = (φ ⇒ E⋉), we call
φ the antecedent of θ and write φ = ant(θ), and we call E the consequent of θ and
write E = con(θ). We often write E⋉ for true ⇒ E⋉. We use Θ ∈ P(2Assert) to
range over sets of 2-assertions (where we often write θ for the singleton set {θ}), with
conjunction implicit. Thus, s&σ |= Θ iff ∀θ ∈ Θ : s&σ |= θ.
For the semantics of command triples, we write {Θ}S{Θ′} iff for all s,s′,σ,σ′, if
s [[S]] s′ and σ [[S]] σ′, and also s&σ |= Θ, then s′&σ′ |= Θ′.
We deﬁne Θ ⊲2 Θ′, pronounced “Θ 2-implies Θ′”, to hold iff for all s,σ: whenever
s&σ |= Θ then also s&σ |= Θ′. In development terms, when Θ ⊲2 Θ′ holds we
can think of Θ as a reﬁnement of of Θ′, and Θ′ an abstraction of Θ. Intuitively, Θ
requires agreement in more cases than Θ′ (Θ is a strengthening of Θ′). For example,
{x⋉, y⋉} reﬁnes x⋉ by adding an (unconditional) agreement requirement on y, and
y < 10 ⇒ x⋉ reﬁnes y < 7 ⇒ x⋉ by weakening the antecedent of a 2-assertion so
that agreement on x is required for more values of y.
5 Computing Preconditions
Figure 4, selected parts of which will be explained later, presents a rule-based precondi-
tion generation algorithm inductively deﬁned over the language syntax. The deﬁnition
uses rules of the form {Θ}⇐= S {Θ′} to specify that, given command S and postcon-
dition Θ′, the algorithm computes precondition Θ. The algorithm uses some auxiliary
functions, deﬁned in Fig. 5, as well as some other functions that will be sketched below
but for whose complete deﬁnitions we refer to [4].
The algorithm does not always compute the weakest precondition; main sources
of imprecision are: on loops, approximations have to be made to ensure termination
of the analysis; on procedure calls, the analysis (for the sake of modularity) uses the
procedure’s speciﬁcation rather than its actual code. As a result, antecedents may be
too weak, yielding too strong 2-assertions.
This algorithm extends our earlier work [5] by adding the notion of universal quan-
tiﬁcation for reasoning about arrays, and a method for inferring universally quantiﬁed
preconditions for certain for-loop structures. The following theorem summarizes the
correctness of the algorithm:
Theorem 1. For all S, Θ, Θ′, if {Θ}⇐= S {Θ′} holds, then {Θ}S{Θ′} holds.
For a detailed proof of this theorem, we refer the reader to [4]. The main structure of
the proof is quite similar to our earlier work [3,5] though a main difference is that we
8{Θ}⇐= skip {Θ
′} iff Θ = Θ
′ {Θ}⇐= x := A {Θ
′} iff Θ = Θ
′[A/x]
{Θ}⇐= h := new {Θ
′} iff Θ = Θ
′[Z/h] {Θ}⇐= h[A0] := A1 {Θ
′} iff Θ = Θ
′[h{A0 : A1}/h]
{Θ}⇐= assert(φ0) {Θ
′} iff Θ={(φ ∧ φ0) ⇒ E⋉ | φ ⇒ E⋉∈Θ
′}
{Θ}⇐= S1 ;S2 {Θ
′} iff {Θ
′′}⇐= S2 {Θ
′} and {Θ}⇐= S1 {Θ
′′}
{Θ}⇐= if B then S1 else S2 {Θ
′} iff Θ =
S
θ∈Θ′ Preif(θ) where
Preif(φ
′ ⇒ E⋉) =
let {Θi}⇐= Si {φ
′ ⇒ E⋉} for i = 1,2
in if S1 preserves E and S2 preserves E
then {(φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B) ⇒ E⋉ | φi ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θi (i = 1,2)}
else {φ1 ∧ B ⇒ E1⋉ | φ1 ⇒ E1⋉ ∈ Θ1} ∪ {φ2 ∧ ¬B ⇒ E2⋉ | φ2 ⇒ E2⋉ ∈ Θ2} ∪
{(φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B) ⇒ B⋉ | φi ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θi (i = 1,2)}
{Θ}⇐= call p (= S) {Θ
′} iff Θ = R ∪
S
θ∈T Precall(θ) where
(R,T) = PreProc(S,Θ
′) and
Precall(φ
′ ⇒ E⋉) = let φ0 = NPC(S,φ
′) in case E of
w : {φ0 ∧ φw ⇒ Ew⋉ | φw ⇒ Ew⋉ ∈ 2PC
p
w}
h[A] : let 2PC
p
h[ ] = ∀u.Θh // S preserves A
in {φ0 ⇒ A⋉} ∪ {φ0 ∧ φh[A/u] ⇒ Eh[A/u]⋉ | φh ⇒ Eh⋉ ∈ Θh}
{Θ}⇐= while B do S0 od (= S) {Θ
′} iff Θ = R ∪ ΘA ∪ ΘW where
(R,T) = PreProc(S,Θ
′) ΘA = {NPC(S,φ) ⇒ A⋉ | φ ⇒ h[A]⋉ ∈ T}
ΘW = Prewhile(S0,B,TW) Tw = {φ ⇒ w⋉ ∈ T} ∪ {φ ⇒ h⋉ | φ ⇒ h[A]⋉ ∈ T}
{Θ}⇐= for q ← 1 to m do S0 (= S) {Θ
′} iff Θ = R ∪ ΘA ∪ ΘW ∪ ΘF where
(R,T) = PreProc(S,Θ
′) u is fresh ΘA = {NPC(S,φ) ⇒ A⋉ | φ ⇒ h[A]⋉ ∈ T}
ΘW = Prewhile((S0 ;q := q + 1),q ≤ m,TW)[1/q]
ΘF = {NPC(S,φ) ∧ φ1[A/u] ⇒ E1[A/u]⋉ | φ1 ⇒ E1⋉ ∈ Θh, φ ⇒ h[A]⋉ ∈ T, Θh  = fail}
Tw = {φ ⇒ w⋉ ∈ T} ∪ {φ ⇒ h⋉ | φ ⇒ h[A]⋉ ∈ T, Θh = fail}
Θh = Prefor(S0,q,m,h[u]⋉) (for all h)
Fig.4. The Precondition Generator
havedisposedwiththe“R-component”;thisallowsforamorestreamlinedpresentation.
Quite similar to those earlier works, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1. : Assume that {Θ} ⇐= S {Θ′} . For all φ′ ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θ′, there exists
φ ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θ such that whenever s [[S]] s′ and s′ |= φ′ then s |= φ.
Observe that it is easy to modify Fig. 4 so that Lemma 1 trivially holds, for example
by adding true ⇒ 0⋉ to all preconditions, but the analysis of a command may become
less precise if the analysis of a subcommand is augmented in that way.
The algorithm can be applied to automatically check or infer information ﬂow con-
tracts. For implementing checking, the algorithm would be used to compute a candidate
precondition from the stated postcondition, and then a supplementary algorithm would
check that the stated precondition entails the computed precondition (this functional-
ity is present in our implementation using theorem-prover technology). We focus on
contract inference in the remainder of our discussion.
As with conventional forms of compositional contract-based reasoning, when pro-
cessing the body of some procedure p, our algorithm assumes that any procedure called
by p already has an associated contract: for each w that may be modiﬁed by p, the
contract contains a precondition 2PC
p
w (at least one assertion in which must be uncon-
ditional) such that {2PC
p
w}p{w⋉}; for each h that may be modiﬁed by p, the contract
contains a precondition 2PC
p
h[ ] which is a quantiﬁed set of 2-assertions of the form
∀u.Θ where we demand that {Θ}p{h[u]⋉}. Since SPARK does not include recursion,
9PreProc(S,Θ
′) =
P ← Purify(Θ
′); R ← ∅; T ← ∅
while P  = ∅ do: remove (φ ⇒ E⋉) from P, and
if S preserves E then R ← R ∪ {NPC(S,φ) ⇒ E⋉}
else case E of
E1 op E2 or E1 bop E2 or E1 ∧ E2 or E1 ∨ E2 or ¬E1: P ← P ∪ {φ ⇒ E1⋉,φ ⇒ E2⋉}
w : T ← T ∪ {φ ⇒ w⋉}
h[A] : if S preserves A and not S preserves h then T ← T ∪ {φ ⇒ h[A]⋉}
else if S preserves h and not (S preserves A)
then P ← P ∪ {φ ⇒ A⋉}; R ← R ∪ {NPC(S,φ) ⇒ h⋉}
else if not (S preserves h) and not (S preserves A)
then T ← T ∪ {φ ⇒ h⋉}; P ← P ∪ {φ ⇒ A⋉}
return (R,T)
Prefor(S0,q,m,h[u]⋉) =
let {Aj | j ∈ J} be all occurrences such that h[Aj] := is a subcommand of S0
let {Θj}⇐= S0 {h[Aj]⋉} (for all j ∈ J)
in if 1. call p preserves h for all call p occurring in S0, and for all j ∈ J it holds that
2. S0 preserves Aj
3. there exists A
′
j with fv(A
′
j) ⊆ {u} ∪ fv(Aj) \ {q} where for all s,n with dom(s) ⊆ fv(Aj),
[[n = Aj]]s = [[q = A
′
j[n/u]]]s
4. there exists φj with fv(φj) ⊆ {u} ∪ fv(Aj) \ {q} where for all s,n with dom(s) ⊆ fv(Aj),
n ∈ {[[Aj]][s|q  → i] | 1 ≤ i ≤ s(m)} iff s |= φj[n/u]
5. if w ∈ fv(Θj) with w  = h then S0 preserves w
6. if h occurs in Θj it is in the context h[A] where for all j1 ∈ J, all s, all i,i
′ ∈ {1...s(m)}:
if [[A]][s|q  → i′] = [[Aj1]][s|q  → i] then i
′ ≤ i
then succeed and return {φj ⇒ Θj[A
′
j/q]⋉ | j ∈ J} ∪
{∧j∈J¬φj ⇒ h[u]⋉} ∪ {x⋉ | ∃j ∈ J : x ∈ fv(Aj) \ {q}} ∪ {m⋉}
else fail
Prewhile(S0,B,Θ
′) =
ψw ← ∅ for all variables w (including a dummy variable d)
for φ ⇒ w⋉ ∈ Θ
′ do
ψw ← ψw ∨ (φ ∧ ¬B); if w / ∈ fv(B) and not (S0 preserves w) then ψd ← ψd ∨ (φ ∧ ¬B)
repeat
for each variable w do {Θw}⇐= S0 {ψw ⇒ w⋉} ;
for each φ ⇒ E⋉ ∈ Θw do
for each z ∈ fv(E) do ψz ← ψz ∨ (φ ∧ B);
if w ∈ fv(B) or S0 preserves w then ψw ← ψw ∨ (φ ∧ B)
for all w ∈ fv(B), for all z with not (S0 preserves z) do ψw ← ψw ∨ ψz
until each ψw stabilizes (through widening) into Ψw
return Θ = {Ψw ⇒ w⋉ | w is variable}
Fig.5. The Precondition Generator, Helper functions
contract inference for all procedures in the program can be carried out via a bottom up
traversal of the call graph.
Concerning the roles of universal variables, they are introduced in two situations:
when analyzing a for loop (the output of Prefor), and when looking up 2PC
p
h[ ] for
procedure calls. In both cases, they are instantiated immediately afterwards. When we
compute summaries, however, universal variables are present throughout the derivation.
For most language constructs, the corresponding rule in Fig. 4 is straightforward.
Assignments, to variables as well as array elements, are handled by syntactic replace-
ment, as in classical Hoare logic.
For a conditional if B then S1 else S2, if E is such that neither S1 nor S2 modiﬁes
E, the the precondition for φ ⇒ E⋉ does not need to involve B⋉. There are several
other instances where the generation of the precondition for S from its post-condition
φ ⇒ E⋉ can be simpliﬁed if S preserves the semantics of E. Accordingly, we utilize
a predicate S preserves E such that if S preserves E holds then whenever s [[S]] s′
we have [[E]]s = [[E]]s′. S preserves E can be computed in a straightforward manner
by detecting if S modiﬁes variables occuring in E either directly via an assignment or
10indirectly via updates in a procedure call (in which case, the procedure’s contract is
consulted).
The NPC Function: When generating a precondition for S for post-condition φ′ ⇒
E⋉ where S preserves E holds, but S may affect the antecedent φ′, we must compute
a new antecedent φ so that {φ ⇒ E⋉}S{φ′ ⇒ E⋉}. For this to be the case, we must
ensure that if two post-states satisfy φ′ then the pre-states satisfy φ and hence E⋉.
Accordingly, we utilize a function NPC computing a “necessary precondition” for
φ′ to hold after S. That is, with φ = NPC(S,φ′) (we can assume φ′ to be pure) it holds
that if s [[S]] s′ and s′ |= φ′ then s |= φ. It may seem counterintuitive that we are talking
about necessary precondition instead of weakest precondition, but this stems from the
contravariant nature of the antecedent component of 2-assertions.
Note that if S preserves φ then we can pick φ0 = φ, and that we can always pick
φ0 = true, but often we can compute something stronger. Our implementation, which
assumes that each procedure p is equipped with a function that computes NPC(p, ),
contains rules such as NPC(x := A,φ) = φ[A/x] and
NPC(if B then S1 else S2,φ) = (NPC(S1,φ) ∧ B) ∨ (NPC(S2,φ) ∧ ¬B).
The Purify Function: As noted earlier, the rules for array update (creation) may gen-
erate a precondition that include impure expressions of the form H0{A0 : A1} (or Z)
that we would not like to see in contracts. We therefore employ a function Purify with
the following properties:
1. given φ, with φ0 = Purify(φ) we have φ ≡1 φ0 with φ0 pure.
2. given A, Purify returns pure φ1 ...φk, and pure A1 ...Ak, such that for all i ∈
1..k: if s |= φi then [[A]]s = [[Ai]]s.
3. given Θ, with Θ0 = Purify(Θ) we have Θ0 ⊲2 Θ with Θ0 pure, and for all
φ ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θ there exists φ0 ⇒ ⋉ ∈ Θ0 with φ ⊲1 φ0.
As an example of case 2, if A is given by h{x : y}[z] then Purify returns φ1,φ2 given
by z = x and z  = x, and A1,A2 given by y and h[z]. As an example of case 3, with A
as above then Purify(y > 0 ⇒ A⋉) is given by
{y > 0 ∧ z = x ⇒ y⋉, y > 0 ∧ z  = x ⇒ h[z]⋉, y > 0 ⇒ (z = x)⋉}.
The PreProc Function: The computation of preconditions for procedure calls and
loops shares certain steps that can be broken out into a preprocessing phase realized
by a common function, called PreProc and listed in Fig. 5. Preprocessing includes two
main ideas: (1) strengthening 2-assertions to a canonical form φ ⇒ Econ⋉ where Econ
must be a variable name or array access expression (but not an operation), and (2) the
immediate construction of preconditions, which is possible for 2-assertions whose con-
sequents are not modiﬁed by the command under consideration. Point (1) is required
for, e.g., the identiﬁcation of dependence connections between a calling context and the
contract of the called procedure. Formally, we have: PreProc(S,Θ′) always terminates
and returns R,T such that
1. for all Θ, if {Θ}S{T} then {Θ ∪ R}S{Θ′}.
2. T is pure, and if φ ⇒ E⋉ ∈ T then either E = w where S preserves w does not
hold, or E = h[A] where S preserves A holds but S preserves h does not hold.
11To prove this result, we observe that an invariant for the loop inside PreProc is: for all
Θ, if {Θ}S{T ∪ P} then {Θ ∪ R}S{Θ′}.
The Prefor Function: The rule (Fig. 4) for for-loops, with associated helper function
Prefor (Fig. 5), generates universally quantiﬁed information ﬂow assertions for arrays,
and is one of the main innovations of this paper. The idea behind this function is to iden-
tifyandexploitacommonpattern:for-loopsareoftenusedtotraversearraystoperform
updates or other processing on a per-location basis and the processing is often done in a
manner in which the current iteration does not depend on previous iterations, i.e., there
are no loop-carried-dependencies [20]. Consider the following procedure body
for q ← 1 to m do (t := h[q] ;h[q] := h[q + m] ;h[q + m] := t) (1)
that ﬂips the values between the upper and lower halves of an array, resulting in in-
formation ﬂow between the two halves. However, if we apply the approach to loop
processing from our previous work [5], we obtain a contract that merely says that the
ﬁnal value of the array is derived from its original value (h from *), but nothing more
precise.
Still, this procedure possesses no loop-carried-dependencies: changes made in the
current iteration do not depend on previous ones. So, we should be able to reason
about the ﬂows in all iterations of this loop (and analogously, ﬂows related to all in-
dex positions of array h) using a single “schematic” iteration (and analogously, a single
“schematic” index position h[u]). And indeed, replacing the for loop by its body (thus
being iterated once only) will result in a contract showing the ﬂow between the two
locations on the separate halves of the array. What we want is a quantiﬁed version of
that speciﬁcation.
The deﬁnition of Prefor given in Fig. 5 implements the above intuition, for a given
array h. (If multiple arrays are updated in the same loop, Prefor must be called sep-
arately on each array.) To handle also multiple updates, none of which can happen
indirectly through procedure calls (condition 1), we let J range over all occurrences
of such updates. Thus each array update is of the form h[Aj] := where (condition 2)
we can not allow Aj to be modiﬁed by the loop body (but we certainly expect Aj to
contain the loop counter). Condition 3 states that each Aj must have an “inverse” A′
j.
For example, if Aj = q +1, then A′
j = u−1. Condition 4 states that the range of each
Aj can be expressed. For example, if q ranges from 1 to 10, and Aj = q + 1, then the
range of Aj is determined by the predicate φj given by 1+1 ≤ u ≤ 10+1. Condition
5 states that nothing in the precondition is modiﬁed except possibly h; that is, there are
no loop carried dependencies between scalar variables. Condition 6 states that there are
no loop-carried dependencies between array locations. That is, an array location is not
read after it has been updated.
Thus conditions 3 and 4 ensure that contracts can be expressed, whereas the absence
of loop-carried dependencies, as formalized in conditions 5 and 6, ensures the sound-
ness of quantiﬁcation: we can reason about a single run of the loop and generalize the
result, because there is no interdependence among the different iterations. If any of the
conditions is not satisﬁed, then the loop is treated as a while loop, in effect smashing
together all array entries without obtaining a quantiﬁed information ﬂow precondition.
The following lemma is a key step in the proof of Theorem 1.
12Lemma 2. Let S be for q ← 1 to m do S0. Assume Prefor(S0,q,m,h[u]⋉) succeeds,
with result Θ. Then for all integer constants c we have {Θ[c/u]}S{h[c]⋉}.
Example 1. Consider the for-loop from (1). With J = {1,2} we have A1 = q , A2 =
q+m. Our algorithm then computes: A′
1 = u , A′
2 = u−m which satisﬁes Condition 3
since (n = q) ≡1 (q = n) and (n = q + m) ≡1 (q = n − m).
Next, we compute the ranges for expressions: φ1 = 1 ≤ u ≤ m , φ2 = m + 1 ≤
u ≤ m + m. This satisﬁes Condition 4 since for all s and for all n,
n ∈ {[[q]][s|q →i] | 1 ≤ i ≤ s(m)} iff s |= 1 ≤ n ≤ m
n ∈ {[[q + m]][s|q →i] | 1 ≤ i ≤ s(m)} iff s |= m + 1 ≤ n ≤ m + m.
With S0 the body of the for loop we now compute
{Θ1}⇐= S0 {h[q]⋉} , {Θ2}⇐= S0 {h[q + m]⋉}
where it is easy to see that Θ2 simpliﬁes to h[q]⋉, and that Θ1 simpliﬁes – assuming
we know that m ≥ 1 – to h[q + m]⋉.
The only non-trivial requirement which is left to check is condition 6 which splits
into4equationsthateachshouldimplyi′ ≤ i(givensandi,i′ withi,i′ ∈ {1...s(m)}):
(1) [[q + m]][s|q →i′] = [[q]][s|q →i]
(2) [[q + m]][s|q →i′] = [[q + m]][s|q →i]
(3) [[q]][s|q →i′] = [[q]][s|q →i]
(4) [[q]][s|q →i′] = [[q + m]][s|q →i]
Here (2) and (3) trivially imply i′ ≤ i since they reduce to i′ + s(m) = i + s(m) and
to i′ = i; (1) and (4) vacuously imply i′ ≤ i since they reduce to i′ + s(m) = i and to
i′ = i+s(m)whichbothareimpossiblegiven1 ≤ i,i′ ≤ s(m).Asallrequirementsare
fulﬁlled, we see that Prefor succeeds for the given program. After some simpliﬁcations,
we end up with the expected preconditions
1 ≤ u ≤ m ⇒ h[u + m]⋉, m + 1 ≤ u ≤ (m + m) ⇒ h[u − m]⋉,
(1 > u) ∨ (u > m + m) ⇒ h[u]⋉, m⋉.
The Prewhile Function For the analysis of while loops (or for loops with loop-carried
dependencies), we employ the function Prewhile (Fig. 5) which expects a postcondition
Θ′ where each θ′ ∈ Θ′ is of the form φ ⇒ w⋉ (w a scalar or array variable).
Theideaistoconsiderassertionsoftheformφw ⇒ w⋉andthenrepeatedlyanalyze
the loop body so as to iteratively weaken the antecedents until a ﬁxed point is reached.
To ensure termination, we need a “widening operator” [13] on 1-assertions. A triv-
ial widening operator is the one that always returns true, in effect converting condi-
tional agreement assertions into unconditional. Our implementation uses disjunction as
a widening operator but returns true if convergence is not achieved after a certain num-
ber of iterations. Space constraints prevent us from further explaining the algorithm (a
variant of which was presented in [5]); we refer the reader to [4].
6 Experimental Assessment
To assess the ideas presented in this paper, we have developed an implementation that
checks and infers information ﬂow contracts for SPARK using our more precise en-
hanced contract language. The algorithm extends our implementation for conditional
13procedure ArrayInit
− −# global out A(∗);
− −# derives for all I in A. Range = > (A( I ) from {});
is
begin
for I in A. Range loop
A( I ) := 0;
end loop ;
end ArrayInit ;
procedure ArrayScrub
− −# global in Scrub Constant ,
− −# out A(∗);
− −# derives for all I in A. Range = >
− −# (A( I ) from Scrub Constant
− −# when should scrub (A( I ) ) ) ;
is
begin
for I in A. Range loop
if should scrub (A( I )) then
A( I ) := Scrub Constant ;
end if ;
end loop ;
end ArrayScrub ;
procedure ArrayTransfer
− −# global in B(∗) ,
− −# out A(∗);
− −# derives for all I in A. Range = > (A( I ) from B( I ) ) ;
is
begin
for I in A. Range loop
A( I ) := B( I );
end loop ;
end ArrayTransfer ;
procedure ArrayPartitionedTransfer
− −# global in B(∗) , C(∗) , K,
− −# out A(∗);
− −# derives for all I in range
− −# A’ First . . K = > (A( I ) from B( I )) &
− −# for all I in range
− −# K+1 . . A’ Last = > (A( I ) from C( I− K) ) ;
is
begin
for I in range A’ First . . K loop
A( I ) := B( I );
end loop ;
for I in range k+1 . . A’ Last loop
A( I ) := C( I− K);
end loop ;
end ArrayPartitionedTransfer ;
Fig.6. Information ﬂow contracts inferred by our implementation for a selection of examples.
contracts described in [5] to support arrays, universally quantiﬁed ﬂow contracts, and
precise processing of for loops as detailed in previous sections.
We tested this implementation on an information assurance application (a MILS
Message Router) that presents a number of challenges due to its extensive use of ar-
rays, a collection of embedded applications (an Autopilot, a Minepump, a Water Boiler
monitor, and a Missile Guidance system – all developed outside of our research group),
and a collection of small programs that we developed ourselves to highlight common
array idioms that we discovered in information assurance applications. We provide a
more detailed assessment of the MMR example after summarizing the results of the
experiments and illustrating the following array idiom examples (see Fig. 6 ).
– ArrayInit:Aprocedure thatinitializesallelementsofanarraytoaparticularvalue.
– ArrayScrub: A procedure that replaces the elements of an array that satisfy a pre-
determined condition, with a particular value.
– ArrayTransfer: A procedure that transfer the elements from one array to another.
– ArrayPartitionedTransfer: Similar to the previous one except that the transfer
from one array to the other is done only within certain partitions (ranges) deﬁned
in each array.
Ineachoftheseexamples,usingoriginalSPARKcontracts/analysiswouldhaveallowed
us to specify only that information is ﬂowing from one entire array to another. Fig. 6
illustrates how our conditional and quantiﬁed contracts allow a much more precise ver-
iﬁed speciﬁcation of the ﬂows.
A total of 66 procedures were analyzed, and information ﬂow contracts were in-
ferred for all of them, taking less than two seconds for each to run on a Core 2 Duo
2.2GHz processor and 3 GB of RAM. Of these procedures, ten included array manipu-
lations that tested our new extensions to the logic. In all of these cases, our implemen-
tation generates a quantiﬁed information ﬂow speciﬁcation showing the dependence
dynamics in the arrays.
The MMR Example: The MMR (MILS Message Router) is an idealized version of a
MILS infrastructure component (ﬁrstproposed by researchers at the University ofIdaho
14A
A
C
D
E
F
B C D E F
B
Is Allowed
Read
Write
Memory
Pointers
A
A
C
D
F
B C D E F
B
E
Policy
MMR
Fig.7. Diagram of the MILS Message Router.
[25]) designed to mediate communication between partitions in a separation kernel [26]
– the foundation of specialized real-time platforms used in security contexts to provide
strong data and temporal separation.
Fig. 7 illustrates a set of partition processes that execute in a static round-robin
schedule.Duringeachschedulecycle,eachprocessisallowedtopostuptoonebounded-
size message to each of the other partitions and receive messages from partitions sent
during the previous cycle. Different partitions do not communicate directly. Instead,
they post messages to the MMR, which only propagates a message if it conforms to a
static security policy represented by a two dimensional boolean array Policy indexed by
process IDs. In Fig. 7, a shaded square (representing the value True) in the Policy array
indicates that the row process (e.g., B) is allowed to send messages to the column pro-
cess (e.g., D). The ﬁgure illustrates that unidirectional communication can be enforced
(e.g., D is not allowed to send messages to B).
During the posting, the infrastructure attaches an unspoofable header to the message
indicating the ID of the sender process and the ID of the destination process. The MMR
places each posted message in a pool of shared Memory slots (represented as an array
of messages), and updates Pointers (represented as a two-dimensional array of indices
into Memory) that organizes incoming/outgoing messages. During posting, a Memory
cell indexed by row A, column B holding pointer X indicates that the memory location
pointed to by X is “owned” by process A and holds a message from process A destined
for process B. Entries in Flags (an array of boolean values with the same dimensions as
Pointers) indicate if the corresponding entry in Pointers represents a valid message or a
“place holder” default message that will not be propagated by the MMR.
Fig. 8 (a) displays the SPARK code for procedure Route that implements part of
the MMR routing phase. Conceptually, messages are routed by swapping Pointers
entries. Before Route is executed, the array of pointers points to outgoing messages,
whereas after routing it points to incoming messages. After routing, a Memory cell in-
dexed by Pointers row A, column B holding pointer X indicates that the memory
15procedure Route
− −# global in Policy . Comm Policy ;
− −# in out Flags , Pointers , Memory . Mem Space;
− −# derives Pointers from ∗, Policy . Comm Policy , Flags &
− −# Memory . Mem Space from ∗, Policy . Comm Policy ,
− −# Pointers , Flags &
− −# Flags from ∗, Policy . Comm Policy ;
is
T : Lbl t . Pointer ;
begin
for I in Lbl t . Proc ID loop
for J in Lbl t . Proc ID range
I . . Lbl t . Proc ID ’ Last loop
if not Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J ) then
Memory. Write ( Msg t . Def Msg , Pointers ( I , J ) ) ;
Flags ( I , J ) := FALSE;
end if ;
if not Policy . Is Allowed ( J , I ) then
Memory. Write ( Msg t . Def Msg , Pointers ( J , I ) ) ;
Flags ( J , I ) := FALSE;
end if ;
if Flags ( I , J ) or Flags ( J , I ) then
T := Pointers ( I , J );
Pointers ( I , J ) := Pointers ( J , I );
Pointers ( J , I ) := T;
end if ;
end loop ;
end loop ;
end Route ;
(a)
procedure Route
− −# global in Policy . Comm Policy ;
− −# in out Flags , Pointers , Memory . Mem Space;
− −# derives for all I in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# for all J in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# Pointers ( I , J ) from
− −# Pointers (J , I ) when
− −# ( Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J
− −# and ( Flags ( I , J ))
− −# or ( Policy . Is Allowed (J , I )
− −# and Flags (J , I )) ,
− −# ∗ when
− −# ( not ( Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J )
− −# and Flags ( I , J ) ) ) and
− −# ( not ( Policy . Is Allowed (J , I )
− −# and Flags (J , I ) ) ) &
− −# for all I in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# for all J in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# Memory . Mem Space( Pointers ( I , J )) from
− −# {Msg t . Def Msg} when
− −# not Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J ) ,
− −# ∗ when
− −# Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J ) ) ) &
− −# for all I in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# for all J in Lbl t . Proc ID = > (
− −# Flags ( I , J ) from
− −# {FALSE} when
− −# not Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J ) ,
− −# ∗ when
− −# Policy . Is Allowed ( I , J ) ) ) ;
(b)
Fig.8.SourcecodeandinitialspeciﬁcationforprocedureRoutingoftheMILSMessageRouter
(a), and information ﬂow speciﬁcation for the same procedure using extended speciﬁcation and
analysis techniques for arrays (b).
location pointed to by X is “owned” by process A and holds a message from process
B sent to process A. For any two processes A and B, the ﬁrst two conditional blocks in
Route determine if messages from A and B (and vice versa) are allowed by the security
policy. If a message is not allowed, then the memory location holding it is cleared with
a default message and the corresponding Flags entry is set to false. Then, if there re-
mains a valid message ﬂowing in either direction, Route swaps the Memory cell indices
in Pointers so that the ownership between the memory locations is exchanged among
the processes (note that if a message is allowed in one direction but not the other, the
swap will propagate a default message in the “disallowed” direction).
There are multiple reasons why it is very difﬁcult to verify statically that the MMR
conforms to the end-to-end information ﬂow policy as captured by the Policy matrix.
First, the examples of Section 2 illustrated the difﬁculties of statically reasoning about
individual cells of an array, and, in the MMR, invalid message channels are “squelched”
by clearing out (with a default message) individual cells within a large array. Second,
theinformationﬂowpathbetweentwopartitionsisnotimplementedviadirectreference
to source and destination memory cells, but instead involves a level of indirection via
the Pointers array. Third, the information ﬂow path through the MMR between two
partitions is not static (e.g., as is the case for information ﬂow between two variables of
scalar type), but it is changing – information for the same conceptual path ﬂows through
different Memory cells whose “ownership” changes on different iterations.
As anticipated, Figure 8 (a) illustrates that the original SPARK annotations for
Routearefartooimprecise tosupportveriﬁcation of thedesiredend-to-end policy. For
example, the derives clause for Pointers states that the ﬁnal value of the array is de-
rivedfromitsinitialvalue(*),fromthecommunicationpolicy(Policy.Comm Policy),
and from the array of ﬂags (Flags). The problem here is that the forced abstraction of
16Pointers array cells into a single atomic entity collapses the individual allowed inter-
partition information ﬂow channels (where we needed to verify separation of channels)
and does not capture the fact that some inter-partition ﬂows are disallowed. Further-
more, we have lost information about the speciﬁc conditions of the Policy that enable
or disable corresponding ﬂows in Pointers. Finally, without precise accounting of
ﬂows for Pointers, it is impossible to get a handle on what we are most interested in:
ﬂows of the actual messages through Memory.
Figure 8 (b) displays a contract in our extended contract language that is automat-
ically inferred using the precondition generation algorithm of the preceding section.
The derives clause for Pointers uses nested quantiﬁcation (derived from the nested
loop structure) to capture the “swapping” action of Route. Moreover, it includes the
conditions under which the swapping occurs or under which Pointers(I,J) retains
its value. The Memory derives clause correctly captures the fact that the cell holding
an outgoing message is “cleared” with the default message when the policy disallows
communication between the sender and destination (the derives clause for Flags has
a similar structure).
7 Related Work
The ﬁrst theoretical framework for SPARK information ﬂow is provided by Bergeretti
and Carr´ e [9] who present a compositional method for inferring and checking depen-
dencies among variables. That approach is ﬂow-sensitive, unlike most security type
systems [31,6] that rely on assigning a security level (“high” or “low”) to each vari-
able. Chapman and Hilton [11] describe how SPARK information ﬂow contracts could
be extended with lattices of security levels and how the SPARK Examiner could be en-
hanced correspondingly. Rossebo et al.[25] show how the existing SPARK framework
can be applied to verify various unconditional properties of a MILS Message Router.
Apart from Spark Ada, there exists several tools for analyzing information ﬂow, notably
Jif (Java + information ﬂow) which is based on [21]), and FlowCaml [28].
Agreement assertions (inherently ﬂow-sensitive) were introduced in [2] together
with an algorithm for computing (weakest) preconditions, but the approach does not in-
tegrate with programmer assertions. To address that, and to analyze heap-manipulating
languages, the logic of [1] employs three kinds of primitive assertions: agreement, pro-
grammer, and region (for a simple alias analysis). But, since those can be combined
only through conjunction, programmer assertions are not smoothly integrated, and one
cannot capture conditional information ﬂows. This motivated Amtoft & Banerjee [3]
to introduce conditional agreement assertions (for a heap-manipulating language); in
[5] that approach was applied to the (heap-free) SPARK setting and worked out ex-
tensively, with an algorithm for computing loop invariants and with reports from an
implementation. All of these works treat arrays as indivisible entities.
Reasoning about individual array elements is desirable for the precise analysis of
a loop that traverses an array. We have established syntactic and semantic conditions
for when we can allow such ﬁne-grained analysis; these conditions include what is es-
sentially the absence of loop-carried dependencies. This suggests a relationship to the
body of work, with [24] as a seminal paper, addressing when loops can be parallel-
lized. Our conditions are more permissive though since they allow a location to be read
before it is written, as for the loop body h[q] := h[q + 1] (whereas we do not allow
17h[q + 1] := h[q]). Even though our focus is on the ﬂow between between array ele-
ments, not their actual content, we might look into the body of work on static analysis
of array content to see if some techniques may improve the precision of our analysis.
Rather than designing a speciﬁc logic for information ﬂow, one can employ general
logic as does the recently popular self-composition technique. Here the information
ﬂow property which we encode as {x⋉} S {y⋉} is encoded as {x = x′} S;S′ {y =
y′} where S′ is a copy of S with all variables renamed (primed); such a property can
be checked using existing static veriﬁers. This is the approach by Barthe et al. [8] that
was extended by, e.g., Terauchi and Aiken [30] and Naumann [22]. The effect of self-
composition can also be obtained through dynamic logic, as done by Darvas et al [14].
When it comes to conditional information ﬂow, the most noteworthy existing tool is
the slicer by Snelting et al [29] which generates path conditions in program dependence
graphs for reasoning about end-to-end ﬂows between speciﬁed program points/vari-
ables. In contrast, we provide a contract-based approach for compositional reasoning
about conditions on ﬂows with an underlying logic representation that can provide ex-
ternal evidence for conformance to conditional ﬂow properties. We plan to investigate
the deeper technical connections between the two approaches.
Ground-breaking efforts in certiﬁcation of MILS infrastructure [17,19] have used
approaches in which source code has been hand-translated into executable models in
theorem provers such as ACL2 and PVS. While the direct theorem-proving approach
followed in these efforts enables proofs of very strong properties beyond what our
framework can currently handle, our aim is to dramatically reduce the labor required,
and the potential for error, by integrating automated techniques directly on code, mod-
els, and developer workﬂows to allow many information ﬂow veriﬁcation obligations
to be discharged earlier in the life cycle.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We believe that the results of this paper provide another demonstration that informa-
tion ﬂow logic as introduced in [2] provides a powerful and ﬂexible framework for
precise compositional reasoning about information ﬂow. The logic seems particularly
well-suited for SPARK because (a) it naturally provides a semantics for SPARK’s orig-
inal ﬂow contracts, and (b) SPARK’s simplicity means that extensive use of the more
complicated aspects of the logic (e.g., object invariants required to handle the heap[3])
can be avoided while still yielding signiﬁcant increases in precision compared to the
original SPARK contract language.
Several challenges remain as we transition this work into an environment that will
be used by industrial engineers. First, the contracts that we infer can be so precise that
they become large and unwieldy. The complexity of the contracts in these cases often
results when the contract makes distinctions between different conditional ﬂows that
are unnecessary for establishing the desired end-to-end ﬂow policy of a system or sub-
system. We are developing tool-supported methodologies that guide programmers in
writing more abstract speciﬁcations that capture distinctions required for end-to-end
policies. Second, although our treatment of arrays using quantiﬁcation works well for
buffer manipulations often seen in information assurance applications, it works less
well when trying to describe ﬂows between elements of data structures such as trees
18implemented using arrays. We are investigating how separation logic might be able to
provide a solution for this.
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